Civil Liberties vs. National Security in Times of Crisis: The Past Use of Internment
Without Trial in the United States and the United Kingdom and the lessons for the
ongoing ‘war on terror.’

History teaches that, in time of crisis, we have often sacrificed fundamental freedoms
unnecessarily. The Executive and Legislative Branches, reflecting public opinion formed in the
heat of the moment, frequently have overestimated the need to restrict civil liberties. This has
been especially true in regards to internment without trial. Neither novel nor normal,
internment is an emergency measure which has regularly been employed in times of national
crisis. Through an examination of two historical models this project aims to identify some the
difficulties associated with the application of a policy of internment. Given it’s ongoing use
around the world in the ’war on terror’ this exercise is a useful one. Rather than considering
the modern use of internment in detail, the aim of the project is to consider the historical
models in an attempt to identify general lessons which can be applied to the present situation.
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INTRODUCTION
“Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged
to provisions against danger from abroad.” 1
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 1798.

Two centuries have passed since James Madison made this address to then Vice President
Thomas Jefferson. During this time, what Madison perceived in 1798 to be a ‘universal truth’
has proven to be just that. A study of recent world history reveals innumerable instances in
which countries, facing a serious threat to their national security, effect provisions to ensure
their safety to the decrement of domestic civil liberties. As Kennedy2 observes our own history
is littered with examples. From the Defence of the Realm Act ushered into being during the
First World War providing for imprisonment without trial to the War Powers (Defence) Act
passed during the Second World War which hugely expanded censorship, history shows that
when national security is threatened, or is perceived to be so, the climate becomes more
favourable for the introduction of repressive legislation: Legislation that Kennedy suggests
‘would never be countenanced during peacetime.’3
The idea of states responding to incipient threats by way of repressive legislation was
central to the work of German legal theoretician and political scientist Carl Schmitt. In his
work, Schmitt offered a blueprint for emergency powers through what he termed the state of
exception. This refers to the situation in which a state is ‘confronted by a mortal threat and
responds by doing things that would never be justifiable in normal times.’4
Whilst a study of recent world history reveals numerous instances in which states
impose measures in extremis to further national security, this is a practice of great antiquity. In
his celebrated book ‘Constitutional Dictatorship,’ Rossiter traces it’s use to Roman times.5 In
times of military emergency the constitution of the Roman Republic provided for the temporary
appointment of a dictator and the suspension of the constitution.6 Laws of appeal and other
safeguards of individual liberty had no force against this dictator. Since this early example of
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national security trumping civil liberties in times of crisis there have been many more. Indeed,
as Brinkley observes, ‘every major crisis in history has led to abridgements of personal liberty.’7
Today the major crisis facing countries worldwide is the threat posed by terrorism.
While terrorism is not a modern phenomenon8 the way in which we assess the threat it poses
was profoundly and comprehensively altered by the events of September 11th 2001. The brutal
attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon forced people to completely rethink their
risks beliefs. As the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies observed, ‘after 9/11 the threat of
terrorism graduated from a public nuisance and a law and order issue into a national security
threat.’9 However, while the unprecedented scale of the 9/11 attacks were ‘beyond the
possibilities that ordinary citizens contemplated,’10 they came at a time when experts had been
defining a new form of terrorism focused on visions of mass casualties.
In June 2000 the U.S National Commission on Terrorism published a report entitled
‘Countering the Changing threat of International Terrorism.’ In this report the commission
warned that terror attacks were becoming ‘more lethal’11 with a view to killing as many people
as possible ‘without concern about alienating sympathizers.’12 This represented a departure
from the politically motivated terrorist organizations active in the 1970s and 1980s who tried to
calibrate their attacks to produce ‘just enough bloodshed to get attention for their cause but not
so much as to alienate public support.’13 In general terms the finding of the commission was
that attacks were becoming more lethal as terrorist motivation was increasingly based on
fanaticism rather than political interests. Other Scholarly sources have reached similar
conclusions.14
An examination of the reasons behind the shift in motivation of contemporary terrorists from
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the political to the fanatical is beyond the scope of this paper.15 However, it represents what
Walter Lacqueur, in the Harvard International Review, termed ‘terror’s new face.’16 This new
face of international terrorism, embodied by groups such as Al Qaeda and exemplified by the
catastrophic attacks of 9/11 has become the most important national security problem facing not
only the United States but countries worldwide. As Kofi Annan has stated, terrorism today is a
threat to “all states and to all peoples.”17 It is in the context of state responses to this threat that
the time honoured debate regarding the balance of civil liberties and national security in times
of crisis has once again come to the fore.
Just days after the 9/11 attacks, George Bush declared the United States as being at
war, not against an identifiable nation-state but against terrorism. Whilst the legal status of this
war is subject to debate,18 its impact on civil liberties is unquestionable. While emergency
powers have traditionally been used for defined periods,19 the Bush administration has portrayed
the ‘war on terror’ and the need for emergency powers as stretching into the infinite future. In
this regard, the war on terrorism is an example of what political philosopher Giorgio Agamben
terms the ‘normalisation of the state of exception.’20 As a 2003 report by the US Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights stated, ‘the expansion of executive power and abandonment of
established civil and criminal procedures have become part of a “new normal” in American
life.’21
The expansion of executive power and abandonment of established civil and criminal
procedures in the war against terrorism have been well documented. The events of 9/11,
accelerated by the attacks in London, Madrid, Bali, Egypt and elsewhere have led to a concerted
effort to adopt measures to reduce the risks of future attacks. As Zeckhauser notes, many such
measures ‘involve costs that are not financial’ but which ‘involve a reduction in civil liberties of
various kinds.’22 One such measure is that of executive detention.
In the context of the global war on terrorism the issue of detention and it’s human
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rights implications has been the subject of much discussion, particularly in regards to those
being held at the behest of the executive in Guantanamo bay and Abu Ghraib prison. However,
rather than review what is already a congested literary field, this project will examine the
historical use of executive detention. As Lord Bingham of Cornhill recently remarked,
freedom from executive detention is arguably the most
fundamental and probably the oldest and most hardly won
of all human rights. Yet, in times of emergency, crisis and
serious disorder it is almost the first right to be curtailed.’23
As governments struggle to find the appropriate balance between national security and civil
liberties in an age of increasing terrorist threat the issue of detention remains controversial. As
part of this ongoing debate it is helpful to examine the past as this may help us to better
reconcile national security and civil liberties today. As the American Constitution Society stated
in its brief of Amicus Curiae to the US Supreme Court in the recent case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
‘only by understanding the errors of the past can we do better in the present.’24
As the two pioneers in the global ‘war on terror’ this project will examine the past use
of detention in both the United States and the United Kingdom. The two historical models of
internment considered are the internment of Japanese Americans and Japanese nationals in the
United States during World War Two and the internment of suspected terrorists in Northern
Ireland during the period 1971-75. These two comparative models have been selected because
they highlight specific difficulties associated with internment. The U.S model identifies the
problem of racism and bias in the application of such a policy while the Northern Ireland
experience was one marred by legitimacy issues and human rights abuses. Furthermore, these
two models are useful in the ongoing ‘war on terror.’ The US model concerns a wartime
response to a perceived threat posed by a group sharing racial characteristics while the Northern
Ireland model is an example of a state responding to a real and significant internal terrorist
threat. Separately each example can be distinguished from the current circumstances, combined,
they provide a more comprehensive framework for analysing internment as a policy.
In examining the past use of internment this project will consider a number of key
issues. Notably, are there any key problems associated with the operation of internment. In other
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words, does history teach us anything about the use of internment? Secondly, what conclusions
can be drawn about the operation of any modern internment procedure? However, before
addressing these key issues through an examination of the two historical models, it is first
necessary to place internment within the context of international law, particularly International
Human Rights Law. As this project’s examination of the historical use of internment without
trial will involve consideration of international law and human rights principles such
commentary is necessary.
INTERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.
The rules of international law which are applicable to internment are set out in International
Humanitarian Law, Customary international law and International Human Rights law.
International Humanitarian Law, a set of rules known as the jus in bello, aim to protect
any person caught up in armed conflict, whether civilian or combatant. In this manner
International Humanitarian law serves as the ’gentle civiliser of nations’25 by placing
‘constraints on sovereign freedoms, prohibiting certain types of weaponry and regulating the
conditions under which an occupied territory and its population are to be treated.’26 In regards to
internment, Humanitarian Law establishes minimum safeguards for the protection of prisoners
of war. Most notable in this regard are the Geneva Conventions.
In addition to protections established under International Humanitarian Law,
protections are afforded to detainees under Customary international law. Customary law results
from a general and consistent practice of states followed out of a sense of legal obligation, so
much so that it becomes custom. As such, it is not necessary for a country to sign a treaty for
customary international law to apply. In this manner, prohibition on slavery and genocide are
considered to be customary international law. Notable in regards to internment is the 1977
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Under Article 75, ‘any person detained or interned for
reasons related to armed conflict shall enjoy the protection provided by this Article.’27 As Sands
observes, ‘it is broadly recognised that Article 75 reflects a rule of customary international
law.’28
The rules of international Humanitarian law deal with internment during periods of
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armed conflict. As such they do not address the issue of a policy of internment introduced by a
state against its own nationals, or foreigners in situations where there is no armed conflict. The
area of law which deals with this is International Human Rights Law.
As Davis suggests, a ‘fundamental component of human rights is the right to liberty.’29
Enunciated in a series of Bills of Rights worldwide,30 the right to liberty is enshrined in
International Human Rights Law in the most fundamental rights documents, notably the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention of
Human Rights (ECHR). Article 9 of the ICCPR states that, ‘everyone has the right to liberty…
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.’31 This document is of particular
importance since it is ‘the most comprehensive and well established UN Treaty on civil and
political rights’32 and has been ratified by both the United Kingdom and the United States. It’s
effect is to prohibit arbitrary detention and ensures due process rights for those detained. Article
5 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) also guarantees that ‘everyone has the
right to liberty and security of person.’33 This is of particular relevance to the UK since the UK
ratified the convention in 1951 and incorporated it into UK law in 1998.
Documents such as the ICCPR and the ECHR provide the ‘positive’ legal basis of the
right to liberty under International law. The guarantees provided in these documents would
appear to prohibit the detention of individuals without trial. However, it is important to note
that international law also recognises the duty of states to protect themselves and their
citizens.34 The conflict between the need to uphold human rights and the needs for states to
protect themselves is dealt with through the process of derogation. Within the ICCPR the
specific derogation clause is Article 4. This states that,

In times of public emergency which threatens the life of the
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nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed,
the State parties to the present Covenant may take measures
derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their
obligations under international law and do not involve
discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex,
language, religion, or social origin.35

The issue of derogation under Article 4 has not been addressed by the Human Rights
Committee (HRC)36 very often. However, as Davis observes, in ‘one important and early
decision the HRC did consider the issue of derogation.’37 In the case of Landinelli v Uruguay38
the HRC examined the necessary ingredients for a ‘public emergency.’ In doing so, the
committee considered the issue of proportionality. As a result of Landinelli, it seems that for a
derogation to be valid a verifiable emergency must exist and the measures adopted must be
proportionate.
SUMMARY: INTERNMENT AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Within the field of international law, particularly International Human Rights Law, the general
right to liberty is well established. Most notable in this regard is the ICCPR and the ECHR. The
guarantees provided in these documents would appear to prohibit any policy of internment
without trial. However, as shown, although the right to liberty is a fundamental human right
with universal application, derogation is possible in limited situations. It is now possible to
examine two situations in which internment without trial has been employed and to consider
these examples in light of international law and the principles of human rights discussed. The
first historical model of internment to be considered is the Japanese American internment.

Section A: The Japanese American internment.
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An often quoted maxim in any debate concerning the balance of civil liberties and national
security in times of crisis is the Roman Law maxim of ‘Inter Arma Enim Silent Leges’39
meaning ‘in times of war the law falls silent.’ In a Republic such as Rome the laws could fall
silent in times of war. In times of military emergency the Consuls could appoint a dictator
whose edicts were not subject to veto. This was thought to be the best mechanism for dealing
with emergencies and a practice which Machiavelli believed ‘was always of benefit to the
state.’40 However, in a modern constitutional democracy such as the United States it would be
an exaggeration to say that the laws fall silent in times of war. Perhaps a better proposition was
offered by William Rehnquist, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
who remarked that “though the laws are not silent in wartime, they speak with a muted voice.”41
This has been particularly true in regards to legal protection from executive detention, namely
the writ of habeas corpus.
Rooted in Antiquity42 and enshrined in the Constitution of the United States,43 the writ
of habeas corpus is regarded as the ‘fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual
freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.’44 It is thus, as Blackstone commented, the
‘stable bulwark of our liberties.’45 However, from the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, through
Abraham Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War, to the Red Scare that
followed World War Two, the compromising of this protection to further national security is a
recurring theme in American political discourse. The most notorious and widely repudiated
example is the mass internment of Japanese Americans, the majority of whom were U.S
citizens, detained without charge during the Second World War. This, as Kuramitsu suggests,
was ‘one of the darkest moments in American history.’46
Today, the Japanese American internment is often cited as a mass scale ‘gross
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violation of human rights’47 and a warning of the dangers inherent in current measures and
practices being used to counter the terrorist threat. However, before exploring the relevance of
this historical episode in regards to the ongoing war on terrorism, it is first necessary to examine
the internment and the factors which gave rise to its implementation.
I. WHAT WAS THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT?
In the three days following the Japanese attack on the U.S naval base at Pearl Harbour, the
United States Government rounded up more than 1,500 Japanese aliens it deemed especially
dangerous. Separately, beginning in February 1942, the government began to ‘slip a tightening
noose of confinement’48 around the entire ethnically Japanese population of the west coast. The
first step was the introduction of a dusk to dawn curfew and imposition of travel restrictions.
Any persons of Japanese ancestry in the affected areas were forbidden to travel more than five
miles from their homes without prior government permission.49 These measures quickly gave
way to temporary detention in the form of so-called ‘assembly centres.’ In the Summer of 1942
this temporary detention gave way to permanent detention in ten ‘relocation centres’ located
throughout the United States. It is this program of indefinite detention in the relocation centres
that is typically referred to today as the Japanese American Internment.
The internment of Japanese Americans was facilitated by the signing of Executive
Order 9066. Signed by President Roosevelt on February 19 1942 this authorized the Secretary
of War, and the military commanders to whom he delegated authority, to exclude any and all
persons, citizens and aliens, from designated areas in order to provide security against sabotage
and espionage. While the innocuously titled “Executive Order Authorizing The Secretary of
War To Prescribe Military Areas” did not specifically mention “Japanese” or “Japanese
Americans,” it was intended to apply to them exclusively. During the course of the war, the
order facilitated the internment of 120 000 Japanese Americans. Those interned were both Issei
( First generation resident aliens) and Nisei ( The children of the Issei, American Citizens by
birthright.) These citizens were held, without due process, in camps operated by a civilian
agency, the War Relocation Authority.50

47

Feingold, Senator Russell D. 2003. Answers to Written Questions Posed to Professor Nadine Strossen, ACLU
President, Following Her Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on November 18, 2003:
“America After 9/11: Freedom Preserved Or Freedom Lost?” Available at http://www.aclu.org.
48
Muller, Eric. 2003.‘Inference or Impact? Racial Profiling and the Internment’s True Legacy.’ Ohio State
Journal
of Criminal Law. Volume 1:103.
49
for an account of such measures and their impact on the Japanese population see John Oakie.1942. ‘Japanese
in the United States.’ Far Eastern Survey. Vol 11, No.2. Jan 26 1942. pp.24-26.
50
Indefinite detention in the ten ‘relocation centres’ in Idaho (Minidoka), Wyoming (Heart Mountain), Arizona
(Poston& Gila River), Colorado (Amache), Utah (Topaz) California (Tule Lake& Manzanar) and Arkansas

10

The internment imposed years of physical, spiritual and economic deprivation on every man,
woman and child of a single national ancestry. No regard was given to citizenship. Rather,
Japanese Americans were interned on the basis of a simple inference about loyalty and potential
subversion that the government drew solely from the fact of ancestry. By arbitrarily confining
American citizens of Japanese ancestry, the government violated the essential principle of
democracy: that all citizens are entitled to the same rights and legal protections. As Robinson
notes, it may be difficult for us, in the 21st Century, ‘to conceive how government officials who
were fighting a war dedicated to the preservation of democracy could have implemented such a
profoundly undemocratic policy. ’51 However, an examination of the decision to intern those of
Japanese ancestry reveals the true vulnerability of human rights and civil liberties in times of
crisis. It thus requires discussion.
II. THE DECISION TO INTERN.
In her recent and highly controversial book ‘In Defense of Internment’ Michelle Malkin warns
that ‘even with the benefit of hindsight…it is not at all clear that the mass evacuation (of
Japanese Americans) was unwarranted.’52 Malkin defends the internment as a military necessity
founded on information which revealed that Japan had organised untold numbers of Japanese
resident aliens and their American-citizen children into a vast network of spies and subversives.
To support her claim, she provides evidence in the form of intercepted and decoded Japanese
diplomatic cables known as Magic cables.53 These, as she argues, revealed a ‘meticulously
orchestrated espionage effort to undermine national security utilizing both Issei and Nissei
before and after the Pearl Harbour attack.’54
Since the declassification of several thousand Magic cables in 1977,55 several
historians have presented them as evidence in support of their revisionist claim that the
Japanese internment was a justified military necessity. In this respect, Malkin’s book offers
nothing new. By the author’s own statement her material is mostly if not entirely lifted from the
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work of the late David Lowman who first tried in the 1980s to make the case that MAGIC
cables justified the signing of Executive order 9066.56 However, the revisionist claim made by
Lowman and Malkin has been widely refuted on several grounds.
Firstly, Muller57 contends that many of the men who proposed and implemented the
internment did not have access to the ultra-secret MAGIC cables. Most notably, the
commanding officer who directed the internment, Lt. Gen. John DeWitt, was not on the Magic
intercept list. Whilst his superior, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, was on the list, it was
Stimson who requested justification for the internment from DeWitt. This step would surely not
have been necessary had the Magic intercepts contained the information that Malkin claims they
did.
Secondly, perhaps the fundamental flaw in any revisionist suggestion that wartime
necessity justified the internment is the fact that while the government forced all American
citizens of Japanese ancestry into camps, action taken against American citizens of German or
Italian ancestry was not of equal magnitude. Whilst the internment of Japanese Americans was
wholesale, German and Italian Americans were deemed to be dangerous only in extreme
individual instances. As General DeWitt stated,

You needn’t worry about the Italians at all except in certain cases.
Also, the same for the Germans except in individual cases. But we
must worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the
map. Sabotage and espionage will make problems as long as he is
allowed in this area.58
In his dissent in the case of Korematsu, considered later in this section, Justice Murphy referred
to this disparate treatment contending that “there was no adequate reason for the failure to treat
Japanese Americans on an individual basis…as was done in the case of persons of German and
Italian ancestry.”59 Muller succinctly captures the practical implications of this disparity
observing that ‘while Lou Shimizu and Joe Takahashi sat in camps, Lou Gehrig and Joe
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DiMaggio played baseball.’60
In her book Malkin justifies this very briefly contending that European enemies posed
a lesser threat to the U.S mainland than the Japanese. As she notes, ‘Japan was the only Axis
country with a proven capability of launching a major attack on the United States and there was
no evidence that Germany or Italy had organized a large-scale espionage network akin to the
one described by Japan's .’61 However, these justifications defy reason. Germany was a more
dangerous presence along the East Coast of the U.S mainland for a longer time than was Japan
along the West Coast. It had twice landed saboteurs on eastern shores62 and had a ‘network of
spies whose existence did not need to be pieced together from vague references in decrypted
diplomatic messages.’63
Perhaps a more viable reason for the incommensurate treatment of those of Japanese
ancestry was racism. As Shayne observes, the Japanese were treated differently from German
and Italian Americans because ‘they were not white and were not well integrated into
mainstream American white society.’64 In what Leone has termed an ‘openly racist time,’65 antiJapanese sentiment was reflected in public support for the internment.
A Gallup poll taken on December 30th 1942 found that ninety seven percent of
Americans living in the Northwest supported the evacuation.66 Similarly, research at the time
indicated that only thirty one percent of Americans favoured allowing interned Japanese to
return to their homes after the war.67 Such hostility towards the Japanese was rooted in a larger
anti-Asian feeling that began with the arrival of Chinese immigrants in 1850.
As gold fever gradually rescinded the Chinese began to take jobs as labourers, often
willing to work for much less money than white workers doing the same job. Due to pressure
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from politicians and labour organizations fearful of Chinese immigration ‘destroying the white
population of the coast’68 the federal government signed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882
banning the immigration of Chinese labourers to the United States.69 This resulted in a decline
in the Chinese population in the country, particularly in California which in turn led to a labour
shortage in the state.
At this time, Japanese labourers began arriving on the West Coast. While they were
initially welcomed as a solution to the labour shortage they, like the Chinese before them, were
soon seen as a threat by the American workforce . As San Francisco Labour Mayor Eugene
Schmitz warned in a 1905 newspaper article, ‘the Chinese are dangerous enough but the
Japanese would drive all competition out of business.’70 Later that year concerns such as that
articulated by Schmitz led to the creation of the first organized anti Japanese movement, the
Japanese Exclusion League. Led primarily by labour groups who held the Japanese responsible
for unemployment and low wages, it’s goal was the complete job exclusion of those of Japanese
ancestry.
Anti Japanese feeling was prevalent throughout the early 20th Century71 and reached
it’s peak in the aftermath of the attacks on Pearl Harbour. Newspapers on the west coast
propagated the existing racism. In a Los Angeles Times article discussing the problem of
dealing with American born Japanese, the writer wrote ‘a viper is nonetheless a viper wherever
the egg is hatched.’72 Such sentiments were typical of the period, particularly on the west coast
were anti Japanese feeling was deep rooted. However, such sentiments were not confined to the
public, they were also prevalent amongst those responsible for the implementation of the
internment.
In affirmation of the decision to proceed with the internment General DeWitt declared
‘the Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born
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on United States soil… have become ‘Americanised,’ the racial strains are undiluted.’73
Similarly, Secretary of War Henry Stimson remarked that ‘their racial characteristics are such
that we cannot understand or trust even the Japanese.’74 Racism, therefore, not only accounts for
the disparity in treatment of those of Japanese ancestry with those of German and Italian
ancestry but was an important factor in the decision to intern.
This indeed was the finding of the Presidential Commission on the Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians in its 1983 report.75 Together with racism the
commission found that wartime hysteria was the other main factor in the decision to intern.
While the Japanese were not liked, wartime hysteria was the catalyst for their exclusion. As Earl
Warren warned,76 ‘the very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is disturbing and
confirming indication that such action will be taken.’ 77 Such a statement is an articulation of
war time hysteria, especially when one considers the findings of a government report prior to
the attack on Pearl Harbour.
In a 1941 report authored by Curtis Munson, special representative of the State
Department, it was concluded that most Japanese nationals and ‘90 to 98 percent’ of Japanese
American citizens were loyal. Munson wrote, ‘there is no Japanese problem on the Coast ...
There is far more danger from Communists and people of the Bridges type on the Coast than
there is from Japanese.’78 Similarly, Lieutenant Commander Kenneth Ringle, a naval
intelligence officer tasked with evaluating the loyalty of the Japanese American population,
estimated that ‘better than 90% of the Nisei and 75% of the original immigrants were
completely loyal to the United States.’79 However, after the attack on Pearl Harbour, in an
atmosphere of wartime hysteria, such reports were disregarded.
Amongst academics the consensus is that the Japanese American internment was the
product of wartime hysteria and racism. The revisionist claim, as proposed by Malkin, that the
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internment was a military necessity is widely regarded as speculative and unsupported by the
facts. However, while Malkin’s attempts to justify the internment as a military necessity are
flawed, her reason for doing so is important.
Malkin has stated that she was ‘compelled to write the book after watching ethnic
activists, historians, and politicians repeatedly play the World War II internment card after the
September 11 attacks.’80 Muller, a notable critic of Malkin and her revisionist theory has
expressed similar concerns and suggests that the author ‘is correct in making the case that the
civil liberties left have not helped anyone think clearly by attacking each step of the Bush
Administration's domestic antiterrorism policy since 9/11 as a reprise of the worst mistakes of
WWII.’81 Most notable in this regard has been David Cole. In his article ‘enemy aliens’ he
warns that ‘by targeting persons based on their Arab identity’ the government has ‘fallen prey to
the same kind of ethnic stereotyping that characterized the fundamental error of the Japanese
internment.’82 As Malkin asserts, ‘we cannot win the war on terror as long as we keep learning
the wrong lessons about World War II.’83 Therefore, in order to learn from the internment, we
have to understand what it’s fundamental error was.
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL ERROR OF THE JAPANESE INTERNMENT.
Those such as Cole who see the Bush administration as repeating the error of the internment
focus on the racist inference at its core. For them, the fundamental error was that the
government inferred from ethnicity something about the risk of subversion that a person of
Japanese ancestry posed. However, this is not the only interpretation. In his article ‘Inference or
Impact’ Muller suggests that the internments fundamental error was ‘the scope of its impact,
rather than the inference that supported it.’84 As this has implications for current debates
regarding measures used to countenance the terrorist threat, it is important to examine Muller’s
proposal. In regards to scope of impact he proposes several mistakes the Roosevelt
administration made.
Firstly, the government not only inferred from race that Japanese Americans were of
mixed, confused or lapsed loyalty, they inferred that a person’s mixed, confused or lapsed
loyalty would make that person more likely to engage in subversive conduct. In this regard, it
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could be suggested that the fundamental error may not be the inference based on ancestry but
the breadth of what the government inferred from this. While this may appear to be a minor
distinction, it is, as Muller suggests, ‘one thing to infer from the fact of a person’s ancestry that
he or she has mixed national loyalties, and quite another to infer that a person’s national
loyalties take him or her a step closer to becoming a criminal or spy.’85
Secondly, again in relation to scope, the government’s basic mistake may have been
the selectivity of it’s inference. Unlike the Japanese, German and Italian aliens in the United
States had never been barred from naturalization.86 This meant that many of the German and
Italian aliens in the Country in 1942 had chosen to hold on to their foreign citizenship. Their
loyalties were thus open to question. Yet the government inferred disloyalty in the case of
Japanese aliens and Americans.
Thirdly, it could be suggested that the fundamental error of the internment was not the
inference but that the scope of the inference was not restricted to aliens. Every person of
Japanese Ancestry along the West Coast was subjected to the measures culminating in
indefinite detention. This led to examples of great indignity such as that reported by the Denver
Post in 1942. In it’s April 10th edition the paper carried a story with the headline ‘Army
Evacuates Jap who served thirty years in the United States navy.’ The 67 year old man, Isakichi
Kanasawa, assumed he was exempt from the evacuation order and was found ‘hoeing in his
garden when the military came to escort him to a relocation centre.’87 Given the possibility of
such indignities, Muller suggests that the line between citizens and aliens ‘might have served as
a sensible stopping point for the inferences about loyalty and the likelihood of subversive
action.’88
Finally, again in relation to scope, the government’s basic mistake might not have
been the inferences alone but the enormity of the burdens and the extent of the suffering it
inflicted on the basis of those inferences. The short term effects of the internment are well
documented: Japanese Americans were removed from their homes and forced to live in
overcrowded camps. Testimonies such as ‘Citizen 13660’ by Mine Okubo give a detailed
account of a the internment experience and illustrate the dramatic adjustment of lifestyle that
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Japanese-Americans had to make during the war.89 However, the long term effects are harder to
describe. During the internment precautions were taken to protect the property of those forced
to move. The personal possessions of the Japanese were indexed, warehoused and the owners
issued receipts. Farms were tended in their owners’ absence, the products sold, and the proceeds
deposited in the proper bank accounts. Despite this, however, many families still suffered heavy
financial losses as a result of the internment and the ‘deleterious effects on Japanese American
individuals, their families, and their communities, went beyond monetary damages.’90
The Japanese American internment was wrong for all the reasons discussed above.
However, in choosing from these mistakes the fundamental error of the internment, Muller
proposes a thought experiment. He suggests we imagine the Roosevelt administration retooled
it’s policies in 1942 in order to fix one, and only one, of the problems that plagued the
internment program. With that problem fixed, would we look back today and not deem the
internment a tragic error?91
Had the government addressed the problem of selectivity by evicting and confining not
just those of Japanese ancestry, but also those of Italian and German ancestry, we would still
regard the internment as a tragedy. Similarly, had the government treated Japanese American
citizens and Japanese aliens differently we would ‘see a more cabined tragedy, but we would
see a tragedy nonetheless’92 as the toll in damaged and ruined lives would still have been
enormous. However, had the government just let people of Japanese ancestry along the West
Coast go about their lives (much as it did with people of German and Italian ancestry) but had
required them to answer extra security questions before going in or near military installations or
buying a firearm for example, we would, as Muller suggests, look back on such program and
see ‘nothing like the tragedy that has haunted us since the 1940s.’93 As Livingston and Gross
suggest, such measures would have been ‘justified’ and ‘certainly preferable to the relocation
and imprisonment that were in fact ordered.’94
Although the ICCPR was not in existence at the time of the internment, an application
of it’s principles is useful in showing the fundamental error of the internment was, as Muller
suggests, the scope of its impact, rather than the inference that supported it. As outlined earlier
in this project, although international law enshrines the right to liberty and would appear to
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prohibit the detention of individuals without trial, there is a competing view that states are
obliged to protect themselves and their citizens from violence. This conflict is dealt with
through the process of derogation. In applying Landinelli to the Japanese American internment
Davis suggests that the actions of the United States were ‘discriminatory, and disproportionate
and therefore incapable of being covered by derogation.’95 The disproportionate burdens
imposed on those of Japanese ancestry on the basis of racial inference can therefore be seen a
the fundamental error of the Japanese American internment.
Consideration of the work of Eric Muller and a retrospective application of modern
international law reveals that the fundamental error of the internment was not the inference that
supported the program but the staggering burdens the program imposed on the strength of this
inference. In regards to the war on terrorism, inferences from ethnicity and the burdens imposed
on the strength of such inferences are controversial in two areas, racial profiling and executive
detention. It is thus important to examine the lessons of the Japanese American internment in
relation to both of these areas.
IV. LESSONS FROM THE INTERNMENT

A) Racial Profiling.
Profiling is based on an assessment of the statistical likelihood of people with particular
characteristics committing particular crimes. During World War II, the United States
government inferred from ethnicity that the Japanese and those of Japanese ancestry were of
questionable loyalty and were thus likely to engage in subversion action. In essence, the
government ‘associated Japanese Americans with the Japanese Empire.’96 This was the central
issue then and is a hotly debated topic today in regard to the association of Muslims with Al
Qaeda.
For those such as Cole who view the fundamental error of the internment as being the
inference at it’s core, the episode ‘dovetails nicely with the current broad condemnation of
racial profiling as arbitrary.’97 Claims from orthodox civil libertarians that any form of racial
profiling today would serve only as a reprise of the mistakes of World War II are common. As
Ridgeway has asserted, ‘the racial profiling that allows the government to keep tabs on
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American Muslims may be the modern equivalent of a concentration camp’98 Whilst such
rhetorical arguments are powerful they do not help us to best decide how to counter terrorism
today. In this manner, an understanding of the fundamental error as being the severity of the
burdens imposed on the strength of a racial inference rather than the inference itself is important
as it creates space within which to consider the use of racial profiling without opening ourselves
to the ‘conversation-stopping charge’99 that we are repeating the mistakes of the past.
At this juncture it is important to note that Muller’s proposal of the fundamental error
of the internment does not teach us that anything short of internment is fine. As Frank Wu
suggests this would serve as a ‘fallacy of false alternatives’100 in which anything short of
internment is compared to the internment, ‘as if to say it could be worse and there is no cause
for complaint.’101 However, neither does it embody the principle that any race or ethnicity based
inference about a person’s suspiciousness is invalid and unlawful. Rather, the Japanese
American internment represents an ‘outer limit’102 and is a ‘paradigm case of going off the deep
end.’103
Today, Khawaja states that ‘it is an undeniable fact that while most Muslims are not
terrorists or even sympathetic to terrorism, the largest part of the terrorist threat we face comes
from Muslims.’104 That is to say that while most citizens of Arab countries and most Muslims
reject and repudiate al Qaeda’s views, all members of al Qaeda are Muslim. Therefore, in this
post September 11 world, Muller suggests that ‘it is just false to say that ethnic and religious
identity do not matter. They do.’105 Whilst an examination of the legality of racial profiling in
the post 9/11 world is beyond the scope of this paper, the Japanese American internment offers
a valuable touchstone for analysis in regards to the potential for such profiling to escalate. The
internment teaches us not that any national origin based inference of suspicion is irrational, but
that it might be nearly impossible for us to cabin state-sponsored discrimination to minor and
proportionate intrusions.
In a period of six months in 1942, the impositions on Japanese Americans spiralled
from a dusk to dawn curfew to indefinite detention in internment camps. In this regard, Muller
compares the escalating burdens to that imposed on the Jews by the Nazi’s, though ‘milder in
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its methods and outcomes.’106 This pattern of escalation may be no historical accident. This is of
relevance in regards to the modern framework of counter terrorism measures.
Council of Europe Guidelines state that ‘when a measure restricts human rights,
restrictions must be defined as precisely as possible and be necessary and proportionate to the
aim pursued.’107 Similarly, in regards to countering the terrorist threat, the United Nations
Security Council passed resolution 1373 which affirms that a ‘states principal objective is to
find ways of reconciling other rights and interests with an appropriate respect for broader
human rights, which may only be interfered with to the degree that is necessary and
proportionate.108 In this regard, the Japanese American internment reveals that it may be
difficult to cabin state measures designed to combat terrorism to ones that are proportionate.
This lesson should serve as a policy consideration for the introduction of minor impositions
based on ethnicity in the war on terrorism.

B) Detention.
While the Japanese internment should not be used as evidence to support the argument that all
forms of racial profiling, however minor, are arbitrary, it serves as historical precedent for the
suggestion that heavy burdens should not be imposed on the basis of racial inference. The
United States authorities, despite being in possession of excellent intelligence regarding the
threat posed by Japanese espionage, notably the Munson report, chose to intern an entire
population rather than attempt to identify those who posed an actual risk. In this regard the
burden imposed on those of Japanese ancestry was disproportionate to the aim pursued. This
has been acknowledged by the US Government.
In 1988 US Congress enacted the Civil Liberties Act. This act acknowledged that
those interned ‘suffered enormous damages, both material and intangible…which resulted in
significant human suffering.’109 Signed into law on August 10 1988 by President Regan, the Act
offered an apology for the internment and provided for restitution. The compensation program
concluded in 1999 following the payment of $1.6 Billion to more than 82000 persons of
Japanese ancestry.110
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The wholesale internment of those of Japanese ancestry was a burden totally out of
proportion to the aim pursued. This aim was the protection of America’s national security. As
the US government acknowledged in the Civil Liberties Act, the threat posed by those of
Japanese ancestry was grossly overestimated. Detention is only legitimate if it is targeted at
those who actually pose a risk. To ensure that only those who pose a risk are interned, Davis
states that it is ‘important that some form of review is possible.’111 He suggests Judicial review
is essential as it ‘provides a clear independent review of Executive actions.’112 In regards to
Judicial review of executive action in times of crisis, the Japanese American internment offers
valuable lessons for us today.

C) The failure of the Judiciary.
In his article ‘The Threat to Patriotism,’ Ronald Dworkin observes that ‘people’s respect for
human and civil rights is very often fragile when they are frightened.’113 The verity of this
observation becomes apparent when one considers surveys conducted in the wake of the 9/11
terrorist attacks. A national survey conducted by Davis and Silver concluded that when
‘exposed to a high level of threat and vulnerability…citizens became more willing to accept
restrictions on civil liberties for greater personal security.’114 These findings are not surprising:
As Brinkley observes, it is natural that citizens react to great crisis viscerally, often ‘venting
their fears in the form of demands for unconscionable actions.’115 However, an important lesson
to be learned from the internment of Japanese Americans in World War II is that Courts, who
ought to be responsible for ensuring that society does not succumb to the fragility that Dworkin
points out, often fail in this regard.
In tracing the history of United States Judicial responses to threats and attacks, Murray
concludes that ‘time after time, the courts, no different from the majority of other Americans,
give their stamp of approval to infringements done largely in the name of national security.’116
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Whilst this is evident in numerous cases,117 the most notorious instance came in a constitutional
challenge to the Japanese American internment, the case of Korematsu. In legal circles today
the Korematsu decision is regarded as a ‘powerful counterexample to any view that executive
and legislative checks and balances, even in a system of separated and divided powers, is
adequate to protect against excessive security measures.’118
In 1942 Fred Korematsu was convicted by the District Court for the Northern District
of California for refusing to obey the wartime order to leave his home and report to a relocation
camp for Japanese Americans. After his conviction was upheld in the Court of Appeal he
appealed to the United States Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the deportation
order. In a six to three decision the Court sided with the government, ruling that the Japanese
American internment was not unconstitutional. In his majority judgement, Justice Hugo Black
explained that although race-based compulsory exclusion was constitutionally suspect it was
justified by the government's assertion of wartime necessity. As he remarked, “hardships are a
part of war… Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as its privileges, and in time of war the
burden is always heavier.”119
While the Supreme Court famously rejected Korematsu’s argument six to three, what
is less known is that the conference vote was much closer. Chief Justice Black, joined by Stone,
Frankfurter and Reed voted to affirm Korematsu’s conviction. Roberts, Murphy, Jackson and
Douglas voted to reverse. As votes are cast by seniority and the court was evenly divided, the
final decision fell to Wiley Rutledge.120 Although Rutledge has been heralded as a ‘champion of
individual rights,’121 in Korematsu, a case now regarded as an abomination,122 he voted to
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affirm Fred Korematsu’s conviction. The reason he did so offers a valuable insight into how
Judges react like others when fearful.123
In a recent biography of Rutledge, John Ferren124 suggests that what led the judge to
affirm the decision in Korematsu was his conviction to legal principle. Rutledge saw Korematsu
as conceptually inseparable from the case of Hirabayashi,125 which had been decided by the
Supreme Court the previous year. In this case the Supreme Court, in Rutledge’s first year at
Court, had unanimously upheld the race based curfew’s application to an American citizen.
While the dissenting Judges in Korematsu renounced their year-old votes, Rutledge did not see
a satisfying basis for changing ground. As he stated, ‘I had to swallow Hirabayashi. I didn’t like
it. At the time I knew if I went along with the curfew order I had to go along with the
detention.’126 None of this remotely suggests that Rutledge voted correctly in Korematsu but it
does shift the error’s location to Hirabayashi.
In his biography, Ferren cites a conversation Rutledge had with his law clerk Victor
Brudney during the Hirabayashi case. Brudney had suggested that the court might benefit from
an FBI report, which had expressed doubts about the need for mass curfews and evacuations. To
this Rutledge replied,
the generals have said this (curfew) is necessary
for the preservation and security of the country.
Pearl Harbour was attacked and more may happen.
Who are we to question this? What makes you think
any of us will question this? Too much is at stake,
and we are too far removed from the realities.127

Thus, in forming the decision in Hirabayashi, which would play a critical role in Korematsu,
Rutledge can be seen as being influenced by fear: a fear which dominated the discourse of both
the public and the courts. As judges cannot be immunized from such fear, in times of threat,
they are often willing to condone infringements of public liberty. As Lord Akins observed,
‘when face to face with claims involving the liberty of the subject (the Judges) often show
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themselves more executive minded than the executive.’128
Today, in the ‘war on terrorism,’ the role of the judges is to ‘protect democracy both
from terrorism and from the means used to fight terrorism.’129 If they are to succeed in this task
they must not succumb to the fragility that is evident in the decision in Korematsu. The danger
of judicial weakness in times of crisis has been affirmed by Aharon Barak, President of the
Israel Supreme Court. In his article, ‘the role of a supreme court in a democracy,’ Barak warns
that a mistake by the judiciary in a time of war on terrorism is worse than a mistake of the
legislature. As he explains, the ‘judiciary’s mistakes will remain with the democracy when the
threat of terrorism passes.’130 This threat was indeed acknowledged by Justice Jackson in
Korematsu. In his dissent he warned that “once judicial opinion rationalizes such an order
(9066) the principle then lies about like a loaded weapon for the hand of any authority that can
bring forward a plausible claim for an urgent need.’131
The importance of the judiciary remaining strong in times of crisis was outlined by
Lord Atkins in the 1941 House of Lords decision in Liversidge v Anderson.132 In his minority
opinion, Atkins affirmed that ‘it has always been one of the pillars of freedom, one of the
principles of liberty… that the judges stand between the subject and any attempted
encroachments on his liberty by the executive.’133 The question before the House of Lords was a
matter of the interpretation of Defence Regulation 18B which provided that the Home Secretary
may order a person to be detained “if he has reasonable cause to believe” the person to be of
hostile origin or associations. A majority of four held that if the Home Secretary
thinks he has good cause that is good enough: a decision which has attracted much criticism. As
Simpson observed, this case was one in which the ‘courts did virtually nothing for the detainees,
either to secure their liberty, to preserve what rights they did possess under the regulation or to
scrutinise the legality of Home Office action.’134
In recent cases concerning executive detention supreme courts have shown themselves
to be more resilient. In the House of Lords case A v Others,135 the courts decision suggests the
‘judiciary’s willingness to function as an ultimate safeguard against measures that contravene
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international human rights standards.’136 Similarly, the US Supreme Court in a trilogy of cases
decided in June 2004 put an end to the period in which the executive had enjoyed unfettered
discretion to detain and interrogate, inside and outside the United States, persons it considered
enemies in the war on terror. In this regard, it has been suggested that the actions of the United
States government have ‘incurred a judicial backlash.’137 The landmark consequences of the
court’s essential holding was that in a democracy founded on the separation of powers the
judicial branch is obliged, even in wartime, to check the executive. However, while these cases
look promising, the idea of judicial review of executive detention is not universal. There are a
number of jurisdictions in which executive detention is beyond the scope of judicial review.138
While the House of Lords in the United Kingdom and the Supreme Court of the
United states have shown signs that they will not simply defer to the executive, other supreme
courts continue to do so. In this regard, Korematsu should serve as a warning of the dangers of
allowing the executive, acting in the name of emergency, unfettered power. As O’Connor
warns, ‘an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to becomes a means for
oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat.’139 Nowhere was this
more apparent than in regards to the internment of Japanese American citizens during World
War II.
Much of the concern today in regards to executive detention at facilities such as Camp Delta at
Guantanamo Bay is to do with human rights abuses carried out therein. The internment of
Japanese Americans involved no such degree of physical torture or abuse. However, in regards
to the Northern Ireland experience with internment in the period 1971-75 , human rights abuses
were part of the internments legacy. In this regard, an investigation of the Northern Ireland
Internment is helpful in showing the repercussions such abuses can have in the fight against
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terrorism.

Section B. The Northern Ireland Internment (1971-75)
Northern Ireland is a country with a long and unfortunate history of terrorist violence.
However, an examination of this history provides a valuable insight as to the potential efficacy
of current measures being employed to combat terrorism. From suspension of the right to trial
by jury, through powers to stop and arrest, to search and seizure provisions, ‘almost every
conceivable form of emergency power has been tried, retooled and enhanced’140 in an effort to
counter terrorism in Northern Ireland. One of the most controversial of these measures has been
internment.
V. BACKGROUND TO THE INTERNMENT.

The power to intern without trial has been on the statutes in both the north and the south since
the partition of the island in 1921. Since this time internment had been introduced on three
occasions in the North, 1931-34, 1938-45, and 1956-61.141 On each of these occasions, the
Minister for Home Affairs in the Stormont government, in consultation with colleagues in the
Northern Ireland Cabinet, had exercised his powers of internment under existing legislation.
The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts 1922-43142 permitted the Minister of Home Affairs
to issue an internment order against a person ‘who is suspected of acting or having acted or
being about to act in a manner prejudicial to the preservation of the peace and the maintenance
of order in Northern Ireland.’143 In 1971, due to increasing terrorist violence within the
province,144 the Northern Ireland government reached the point where they felt it necessary to
resort once again to the powers of internment. As then Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Mr.
Brian Faulkner, said
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the terrorist campaign continues at an unacceptable level,
and I have had to conclude that the ordinary law cannot
deal comprehensively or quickly enough with such ruthless
viciousness…I have therefore decided, after weighing all
the relevant considerations… to exercise where necessary
the powers of detention and internment vested in me as
Minister of Home Affairs.145

Whilst internment had been introduced in the province on three previous occasions, following
the deployment of British troops in 1969 the Northern Ireland government could not
reintroduce internment in the manner which it had previously. Support of the British army was
required and thus the consent of the British government was needed. As Minister of State for
Defence Balniel commented, ‘a decision for internment is a decision taken by the Northern
Ireland government after consultation with the government of the United Kingdom.’146
VI. THE DECISION TO INTERN.
The unprecedented proportions of political violence in the province by the middle of 1971 was
clearly the ‘dominant factor behind the decision to exercise the extra judicial Power of
internment.’147 However, three principal reasons for the decision have been suggested by the
Government. These have been noted by the European Court of Human Rights.148
Firstly, the authorities took the view that the normal procedures of investigation and
criminal prosecution had become inadequate to deal with the terrorists. It was felt that the
ordinary criminal courts could no longer be relied on as the sole process of law for restoring
peace and order.
The second reason given, which was closely related to the first, was that widespread
intimidation of the population often made it impossible to obtain sufficient evidence to secure a
criminal conviction against a known terrorist. In regards to the IRA, the difficulty of obtaining a
conviction was exacerbated by the grip the organisation had on certain so-called “no-go areas”
in the province. These were ‘Catholic strongholds where terrorists, unlike the police, could
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operate in comparative safety.’149 This greatly impeded the efficacy of police enquiries.
Thirdly, there was, in the judgment of both the Northern Ireland Government and the
United Kingdom Government, no hope of winning over the terrorists by political means. The
authorities therefore came to the conclusion that it was necessary to introduce a policy of
detention and internment of persons suspected of serious terrorist activities but against whom
sufficient evidence could not be laid in court.
VII. OPERATION OF INTERNMENT.
On the 9th of August 1971, despite British army reluctance and British government
misgivings,150 Northern Ireland Prime Minister Brian Faulkner was given the go-ahead by
London to reintroduce internment. While the decision to reintroduce internment was recognised
as a political gamble, it was considered worth the risk if sufficient numbers of active
paramilitaries could be taken out of action.151 As Bell suggests, internment was ‘one of the few
remaining unplayed cards that would… calm the majority with a symbolic triumph.’152
Operation Demetrius, the army code-name for the internment, went into operation at
4am on the morning of the 9th August 1971. The army, with police officers occasionally acting
as guides, arrested 452 persons whose names appeared on the final list. In the event, some 350
persons were arrested in accordance with the Special Powers Regulations. These persons were
taken to one of the three regional holding centres situated at: Magilligan Weekend Training
Centre in County Londonderry, Ballykinler Weekend Training Centre in County Down and
Girdwood Park Territorial Army Centre in Belfast. All those arrested were subjected to
interrogation by police officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and within 48 hours,
104 persons were released. Those who were to be detained were sent on to the prison ship
‘Maidstone’ docked in Belfast Lough or to Crumlin Road Prison. 153
The initial internment sweep was a complete military failure. As McGuffin notes, ‘the
IRA had known of it for some time and as a result virtually every senior IRA man was billeted
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away from home.’154 Further, the information upon which the operation was founded was later
shown to be outdated. Many of those arrested had no connections with the IRA. Others,
although Republican minded, had not been active in decades. In one instance in Armagh the
British Army sought to arrest a man who had been dead for the past four years. The poor
information on which the operation was founded has been acknowledged by the European Court
of Human Rights which observed that due to ‘the scale and speed of the operation,’ ‘some
persons were arrested and detained on the basis of inadequate or inaccurate information.’155
An important aspect of the internment operation was that Operation Demetrius was
activated almost exclusively against suspected Republicans. As the British Home Secretary
candidly stated in 1971, the aim of the internment was to ‘hold in safety, where they can do no
further harm, active members of the IRA… to help the security forces in their job of protecting
the public as a whole.’156 Whilst the possibility of interning Loyalists was discussed in the
preparatory stages the security forces were not of the opinion at this stage that there was any
serious threat coming from the Loyalist quarter. It was IRA terrorism that was regarded as the
‘real menace to law and order.’157 Protestant terrorist activity was seen by the authorities as
‘being on a minute scale in comparison and on a much less organised basis.’158
During the internment period of 1971-75, 2,060 suspected Republicans were
interned.159 Despite advice that the authorities should ‘add a few Protestants to the list,’160 only
109 suspected Loyalists were interned.161 This partisan approach to political violence generated
outrage in the Catholic community. As Brady remarked, ‘the continued internment of
“Catholics only” despite the campaign of slaughter by the UVF and its satellites is quite
scandalous.’162 The explanation offered by the British government for the disparate treatment
was that Republicans were better organised than their Loyalist counterparts and were thus
responsible for more death and destruction. However, as McEvoy notes, when one examines
body counts as a measure for levels of violence, Loyalists too were responsible for a large
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number of deaths.163 This perception of discrimination was considered by the European Court
of Human Rights in 1978.
VIII. INTERNMENT & THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
The issue of internment in Northern Ireland was brought before the European Court of Human
Rights in 1978 in the case of Ireland v UK. In this case the Government of the Republic of
Ireland brought an application before the Commission alleging, inter alia, that the extra judicial
detention infringed Article 5 of the ECHR (right to liberty) and was not saved by the derogation
provided in Article 15. Whilst the internment itself was held to be in violation of Article 5 it
was recognised that derogation was permissible ‘in times of war or other public emergency.’
Applying this to Northern Ireland, the Court concluded that the requisite emergency existed. As
such the internment procedure was upheld.
An important aspect to this case was that the Government of the Republic of Ireland
also alleged that the use of the special powers primarily against IRA members constituted
discrimination in violation of Article 14 of the ECHR. On the specific allegation of sectarianism
the Court justified the difference in treatment noting that
There were profound differences between Loyalist and
Republican terrorism… The IRA, with its far more
structured organisation, constituted a far more serious
menace than the Loyalist terrorists… [Also] although
Loyalists were not extra judicially deprived of their liberty,
they do not appear to have been able to act with impunity.164
This passage is quoted due to the importance of the points raised. As Davis states, ‘the
allegation of sectarianism is a serious one.’165 The acceptance by the Court that the disparate
treatment did not imply discrimination is important as internment was thus held not to be in
violation of Article 14. The right of the UK Government to utilise a policy of internment was
thus upheld.
Although the European Court upheld the right of the UK Government to utilise a
policy of internment, in doing so holding the internment to be non-discriminatory, this was the
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feeling of those in Catholic communities. This perception of sectarianism manifestly
contributed to the failure of internment in Northern Ireland.
IX. THE FAILURE OF INTERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
The decision to reintroduce internment in Northern Ireland has been referred to as ‘one of the
most counterproductive decisions in the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process.’166
Introduced as a measure to try and curb the terrorist threat it was, in practice, totally ineffective
in this regard. Rather than reducing the level of political violence, internment fuelled it’s
escalation. As Dickson remarked, the reintroduction of internment was ‘like pouring petrol on
to smouldering embers in Northern Ireland.’167 Statistical evidence shows that in 1972, the first
full year of internment, Northern Ireland experienced it’s most violent year: There were 1,382
explosions and 10,628 shootings in the province.168 This spike in violence has been documented
in the work of Kieran McEvoy who observes that ‘the degree and intensity of the violence in the
aftermath of internment has not been matched either before or since.’169
While the short term effect of the internment was an escalation in violence, it’s long
term effects have proven to be more damaging. Speaking in 1975 Brady warned that the
internment was ‘sowing dragon’s teeth and ensuring trouble in future generations.’170 The
variety of his warning becomes apparent when one considers the effect of the internment on the
Catholic community.
Activated exclusively against suspected Republicans the internment was thus aimed
‘de facto against the Catholic community.’171 Consequently, it had the effect of alienating a
sizeable minority of the population. As Cushnahan observes, ‘despite the two-sided nature of
the violence, the internment was exclusively directed against minority areas. At a stroke it
alienated the entire catholic community overnight.’172 This alienation was exacerbated by
human rights abuses carried out within the detention facilities.
The human rights abuses carried out during the Northern Ireland internment are well
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documented. Accounts of former internees reveal the brutal nature of interrogation carried out
in the detention facilities.173 Such abuses prompted international concern. Amnesty international
visited in 1974 and in it’s report concluded that ‘maltreatment of suspected terrorists by the
RUC (had) taken place with sufficient frequency to warrant the establishment of a public
inquiry to investigate it.’174 A similar report was made by the International Red Cross.
The Abuses documented in the reports of Amnesty international and the international
red cross were substantiated in the case of Ireland v UK with the Government of the Republic of
Ireland alleging, inter alia, that various interrogation practices, in particular the so-called ‘five
techniques,’175 amounted to torture and inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 3.176
Whilst the court held thirteen votes to four that ‘the said use of the five techniques did not
constitute a practice of torture within the meaning of Article 3,’177 the practice was held to be
both inhuman and degrading. It was inhuman in that the ‘five techniques were applied in
combination, with premeditation and for hours at a time, causing at least intense physical and
mental suffering and acute psychiatric disturbances.’ It was degrading as the ‘techniques were
such as to arouse in the victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating
and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance.’178
The Human rights abuses committed during the internment served to further alienate
the Catholic community and led to deep feelings of resentment therein. In this regard, the
internment served as ‘one of the best recruiting tools the IRA ever had.’179 Numerous persons
who had no previous terrorist affiliations were driven to join outlawed organisations due to the
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brutal treatment of internees. As Fields observes, ‘when they were initially selected it was clear
that many of the men had no political commitment or partisan preferences… The intense
crowding and competition, the arousal of hatred and physical aggression, resulted in the
polarisation of the internees into two groups, those sympathetic with and committed to the
Official IRA and those committed to the Provisionals.’180
The internments alienation of a sizeable minority of the population of Northern Ireland
not only served as an effective recruiting tool for the IRA but also had a deleterious effect on
community cooperation with authorities. Virtually no one in Catholic communities would
cooperate in any way with governmental authorities at this time, including groups such as the
SDLP who were absolutely opposed to the use of violence.181 In this respect, by undermining
community cooperation with the government, the finding of Lord Gardiner was that the
internment served to ‘obstruct those elements in Northern Ireland society which could lead to
reconciliation.’182 The true failure of internment was summed up by Desmond Hamill, a
member of the British Army who was closely involved in the enforcement of the internment
policy. As he remarked,

The British army, as the instrument of internment has
become the object of Catholic animosity. Since that day
when internment was reintroduced…it has done little to
provide a return to a semblance of law and order, a basis
for a political solution to Ulster’s problems. Ironically,
it appears to have produced the opposite effect. . . . It has,
in fact, increased terrorist activity, boosted IRA recruitment,
Polarised further the Catholic and Protestant communities
and reduced the ranks of the much needed Catholic moderates.183

After examining the failure of the policy of internment introduced in Northern Ireland during
the period 1971-75 it is important to outline the lessons to be learnt from this episode.
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X. LESSONS FROM THE NORTHERN IRELAND INTERNMENT.
Terrorism exists only when there is some base of support for it within a community. Therefore,
in order to counter the terrorist threat today it is necessary to weaken support at the community
level. As the Council of Europe has asserted, ‘the fight against terrorism implies long-term
measures with a view to preventing the causes of terrorism.’ This is to be achieved by
‘promoting cohesion in our societies and a multicultural and inter-religious dialogue.’184
However, as the Northern Ireland case shows, a government’s response to terrorism rarely takes
the form of long term measures aimed at preventing the causes of terrorism. Usually, the
response takes the form of short sighted legislation passed ‘in the superheated environment
immediately following a terrorist attack.’185 This pattern has long held true in Northern Ireland
and is apparent in the reaction to the events of September 11 and subsequent terrorist attacks.
As the Northern Ireland case shows, measures introduced which violate human rights
merely serve to perpetuate terrorist violence by sustaining community support for the terrorists.
Speaking at a recent roundtable discussion at Queen’s University, Victor Ramraj affirmed that
the Northern Ireland internment created a ‘perpetual cycle of violence.’186 The acts of political
violence committed by paramilitary organisations led to calls for greater powers to curb the
violence. The introduction of Internment and the human rights abuses carried out by the security
forces lead to further alienation of the community and an increase in terrorist activity. Today, in
the ‘war on terrorism,’ this lesson must not be forgotten.
In fighting terrorism today we need the cooperation of Arab and Muslim citizens.
Although the government has frequently protested that the war is not against Arabs or
Muslims,187 by targeting these communities within our society risk ‘alienating law-abiding
citizens who would otherwise prove helpful.’188 As Khan observes, Muslims have an enormous
potential to become an important ally in the war against terrorism. If consulted and brought into
counter terrorism planning, he suggests they can help us become ‘more effective, more focused,
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and more cost effective’ in our efforts to curb the terrorist threat.189
Today, early indications are not promising. As the House of commons Home Affairs
Committee concluded, ‘community relations have deteriorated…International terrorism and the
response to it have contributed to this deterioration, particularly in relations between the
majority community and the Muslim community.’190 Similarly, in the United States, the U.S.
Department of Justice Community Relations Service (CRS) has observed such a deterioration in
relations.191
Internment at detention facilities such as Guantanamo bay and the human rights abuses
committed therein serve only to perpetuate terrorist violence and are thus contrary to the aim of
preventing terrorist attacks. As the Northern Ireland Commission for Human Rights has stated,
‘the experience in Northern Ireland of internment without trial shows clearly that it is both
ineffective and counter-productive.’192

Conclusions.
Freedom from executive detention is, as Lord Bingham stated, ‘the most fundamental… of
human rights.’193 As such, a general right to liberty is enshrined in the most fundamental rights
documents, notably the ICCPR and the ECHR. However, throughout history, in times of
emergency, crisis and serious disorder this right has been curtailed. The two models of
internment examined in this project reveal the true vulnerability of civil liberties in such times.
The US, faced with a perceived threat to national security, adopted emergency powers
culminating in the ‘indiscriminate internment of an entire class based solely on their ethnic
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origin.’194 This was unacceptable as has been recognised by the US government. The policy was
biased in its application and disproportionate to the aim pursued. The internment policy
implemented in Northern Ireland has also been criticised for its biased application. Although the
European Court of Human Rights rejected the claim that the internment was discriminatory in
its application, this was the feeling amongst the catholic minority in the province and this
manifestly contributed to the failure of internment and the propagation of violence in the
province. Therefore, both the US and Northern Ireland model have been widely criticised as
being discriminatory. In the US case, this discrimination was racial while in the Northern
Ireland case it was discrimination on the grounds of religious affiliation.

Lessons from the two models of internment.
The two models occurred at different times in very different regions but common problems
were encountered, allowing common conclusions to be drawn. Internment should only be
utilised when it is absolutely necessary. It is a severe restriction on the right to liberty and thus
should not be employed lightly. It is vital that up to date and accurate intelligence is gathered
before any such information is employed. A lack of such information contributed to the failure
of internment in Northern Ireland.195 However, as the US model shows, it is vital that this
information is used. As Davis observes, ‘one of the most disappointing aspects of the US model
was that use of available intelligence could have avoided the racist application of the
scheme.’196 Internment must also used against those who actually pose a risk. The wholesale
internment of Japanese Americans was in this regard totally unacceptable. Detention is only
legitimate if it is targeted at those who actually pose a risk. To ensure compliance with this it is
important that judicial review is available. Such review was available in the US. However, the
court simply deferred to the executive’s assertion of wartime necessity. In the modern war on
terror, Supreme Court’s must show themselves to be more resilient to executive encroachments
on civil liberties. The recent detention cases both in the UK and the US look promising. Finally,
whilst internment is permitted under international law, its effects on society may nevertheless be
contrary to the aim of combating terrorism. In Northern Ireland the existence of an emergency
in the province was accepted by the European Court of Human Rights and as a result derogation
under Article 15.1 was legally possible. Further, the court held that the policy of internment was
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not discriminatory in its application. However, whilst to the lawyer derogation was permissible
and the model non-discriminatory, when applied, the model caused deep and lasting resentment
and questions about its legitimacy persist. These issues ‘go to the heart of the internment
question.’197
In regards to today’s efforts to counter terrorism, the basic balance that must be drawn
between civil liberties and national security has been outlined by the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Whilst recognising that it is the ‘duty of States
to protect those living within their jurisdictions from terrorism,’ it has ‘placed a priority on the
question of protecting human rights in the context of counter-terrorism measures.’198 Similarly,
when the Council of Europe adopted it’s ‘Guidelines on human rights and the fight against
terrorism,’ the aim was to reconcile two requirements: ‘defending society and preserving
fundamental rights and freedoms.’199 A continuing are of controversy in regards to this balance
is the issue of internment. In reconciling civil liberties today, the lessons from the past assaults
on freedoms discussed must not be forgotten. As Stone observes,
That we have made mistakes in the past does not
mean we should make mistakes in the present.
We should learn from our experience.200
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